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I. Introduction
Over the past few years, in reaction to widespread corporate
malfeasance, compliance initiatives within large corporations have
received significant attention. Private corporations, public regulatory
and enforcement agencies, and Congress, all recognize that compliance
plays a critical role in today's highly complex business environment.'
Nearly all of the nation's public companies maintain compliance
programs that formulate corporate rules and policies in response to
industry regulations and applicable laws.2 Recently, Congress passed the
* David Ian Wishengrad is a J.D. candidate at Pace University School of Law, class of
2005. He graduated from Duke University with an A.B. in Psychology. He also received
a M.B.A. in Finance from New York University Leonard N. Stem School of Business.
1. See, e.g., Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, to the
Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate- guidelines.htm. In this January 2003 policy
memorandum, federal prosecutors are urged to review several factors before indicting a
corporation. These elements include (1) the nature and seriousness of the behavior; (2)
the pervasiveness of corporate wrongdoing; (3) the corporation's history of similar
conduct and prior enforcement actions against it; (4) the voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing; (5) the existence and adequacy of a corporate compliance program; (6)
remedial actions; (7) the collateral consequences of a conviction; and (8) the sufficiency
of civil remedies for the corporation's conduct. Id.
2. Id.
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 due, in part, to a need for more responsible
corporate governance. 3 The Act, though covering a wide spectrum of
governance issues, significantly increases the importance of compliance
programs and directly implicates the efficacy of compliance initiatives as
determinative of corporate accountability.4 The new body of law guiding
corporate compliance is bound to have a profound effect on the behavior
of large complex organizations.
The modern corporation seeks to optimize future performance by
assessing how well it interacts with its environment (e.g. customers,
competitors, and regulators). 5 As organizational behaviorist Jay Galbraith
states, sophisticated "organizations typically find ways of controlling
outputs (e.g. by setting goals and targets) and controlling behavior (e.g.
through rules and programs) by relying on continuous feedback.",6 The
ability to process external information and adjust behavior to meet
corporate objectives, has led many scholars to view the corporation as an
organic-like being with a "centralized brain that regulates overall
activity.",7 In this regard, sophisticated corporations exhibit complex
decision-making processes akin to those found in humans.8 While
organizational behaviorists have readily accepted that sophisticated
corporations are entities engaged in rational-based decision-making and,
as such, readily exhibit identifiable behavior, to this day the law has not
fully embraced this concept. 9
Unlike the philosophical underpinnings that have helped shape our
notions of applying fault-based law to "natural" persons, the theoretical
basis of corporate fault relies heavily on the doctrine of imputed liability,

3. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002).
4. Id. at § 501.
5. See KARL E. WEICK, SENSEMAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS 121-122 (1991).
("[Organizations] filter and interpret signals from the environment and tie stimuli to
responses. They are metalevel systems that supervise the identification of stimuli and the
assembling of responses." (quoting B. Hedberg, How OrganizationsLearn and Unlearn,
in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, 7-8 (P.C. Nystome & W.H. Starbuck ed. vol.
1))).
6. GARETH MORGAN, IMAGES OF ORGANIZATION 80 (1996).
7. Id. at 78.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1995). In
Nordstom, the court suggests the legitimacy of finding "corporate scienter" without any
of the officers or directors of the corporation having intent under a theory of "collective
scienter" but acknowledges that "there is no case law supporting an independent
collective scienter theory." Id. at 1435.
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0
economic justification, and, to some degree, public policy.' It is wellsettled law that corporations may be held liable for nearly any tortious or
criminal activity of an employee, as long as that employee acted within
the scope of employment." Thus, corporate liability is often regarded as
derivative in nature. 12 However, there has been very little inquiry on
whether a corporation itself, without identifiable human involvement,
can be a fault-bearing decision-making entity. The threshold question
addressed by this comment is whether an organization can exhibit "fault"
sufficient to meet requisite elements of scienter for certain violative
behavior. The thesis of this paper is that legally significant information
regarding "organizational scienter" can be gleaned, not only from the
traditional method of imputed behavior from officers, directors, and
employees, but also "organizationally," from the internal rules and
procedures a corporation uses to interact with its environment. Modem
complex organizations have simply become too complicated - too
impersonal - not to reevaluate how courts, the legislature, and the law in
general view organizational behavior in relation to statutorily-required
scienter elements.
At first glance, assigning a traditional scienter element (e.g.
negligence, recklessness, knowingly or intentionally) to a corporation in
the absence of human decision-making, seems antithetical to the precepts
and legal assumptions of fault-based law. Traditionally, fault-based law
assumes some rational decision-making process by a natural person and
an irrational or unreasonable course of conduct before the apportionment
of fault.' 3 But large corporations present a special problem in terms of
applying traditional fault-based statutes based on derivative liability. By
virtue of the inherent anonymity and insulation employees enjoy within
highly impersonal organizations, an individual's contribution to injurious
corporate behavior is often too tenuous to meet evidentiary burdens of
fault-based statutes. ' 4 Only recently, legal reformers began offering more
10. JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 231-32 (2002).

11. Id. at 231; see also N.Y. Central & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212
U.S. 481 (1908) (extending the doctrine of respondeat superior, generally reserved for
tort liability, to criminal liability).
12. See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 420-429.
13. See generally UNDERSTANDING TORTS, supra note 10, at 67-77.
14. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16
(1998). The Restatement addresses the situation in which the plaintiff establishes
increased harm because of a product defect, but proof does not permit determining its
magnitude. Id. The Products Liability Restatement imposes liability on the product
manufacturer for the entirety of the harm. Id. Thus, the Products Liability Restatement
does not require the plaintiff to prove the magnitude of harm caused by each tortfeasor
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progressive "alternative" theories of liability, akin to those within the
"organizational behaviorist" domain. 15 These theories consider the
organizational mechanisms that lead corporations to cause harm without
help from a significant or identifiable concentration of human
involvement.
This paper examines the extent to which corporate "rules and
policies" serve as a viable source of judicial scrutiny from which to
examine an alternative theory of liability. Specifically, the paper
explores the rapidly evolving regulatory environment of the securities
industry, and proposes that a corporation's set of compliance initiatives
is a viable area to determine "organizational" scienter. Evidence that a
firm's compliance initiatives are substantially inconsistent with industry
standards should meet the statutory requirements of pleading scienter
under federal securities law.
Part II of this paper will review the federal securities laws and the
specific problems the various circuit courts encounter in defining the
requisite level of scienter in pleadings. Part III will examine the legal
effect given to the main compliance device - "Chinese Walls" - and the
changing role they play in the new regulatory environment. Part IV
looks at case law suggesting that organizational scienter is already being
gleaned from various internal corporate procedures. Finally, Part V puts
forth a similar analysis advocated in products liability law, wherein
compliance policies are adjudicated based on a comparative approach
which views a specific compliance department's function in relation to
the industry rules and compliance policies of other firms.
II. Brief Overview of the Federal Securities Laws
In the aftermath of the stock market crash of 1929, Congress
enacted the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.16 These Acts were aimed at preventing dishonest trading schemes
while restoring public confidence in the capital markets. 7 Congress
and imposes the burden of proof on the party seeking to limit its liability on the ground
that it caused less than all of the plaintiff's harm. Id.
15. Id.
16. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2003);
Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2003).
17. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 n.7 (1963)
(citing William 0. Douglas and George E. Bates, The FederalSecurities Act of 1933, 43
YALE L. J. 171 (1933); Phillip A. Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214 (1959); Harry Shulman,
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enacted this legislation in order to "substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and to achieve a high
standard of business ethics in the securities industry." 18 The Securities
Act of 1933 protects the public during an initial public offering of a

company's stock by requiring that all material information be
communicated to the public via a written prospectus. 19 Information is
"considered material if 'there is a substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information
available."'

20

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 extends these

protections to securities already issued and imposes additional disclosure
requirements in connection with tender offers and proxy solicitations. 21
Both acts contain provisions making it illegal for any person, or
corporation, to disclose misleading information to the public.2 2
Private civil actions, as well as regulatory enforcement actions, are
Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933); cf JOHN K. GALBRAITH,

(1955)).
18. Id. at 186 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.).
19. See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2003).
20. See SEC v. First Jersey Securities, Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1466 (2d Cir. 1996)

THE GREAT CRASH

In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267-68 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal
omitted)).
See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78.
See Securities Act of 1933, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 77:
Any person who (1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 5 [15 U.S.C.S.
§ 77e], or (2) offers or sells a security... by the use of any means or instruments
of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by
means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement
of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and
in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission, shall be liable, subject to subsection (b), to the person purchasing such
security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with
interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender
of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
See also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77j:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange... (b) To use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security no so registered,.. any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors...
(quoting
citations
21.
22.
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brought under Rule lOb-5 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.2 3 In order to prevail in a civil securities action, a plaintiff
must establish (1) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (2) scienter on the
part of the defendant; (3) reliance on the misrepresentation; and (4)
damage resulting from the misrepresentation.24 Along with the Rule's
statutory elements, the Supreme Court has interpreted lOb-5 violations to
require proof that a defendant possessed a "mental state embracing intent
to deceive, manipulate or defraud., 25 Although the Supreme Court has
never clearly defined the requisite level of scienter,26 nearly all the
federal circuit courts agree that recklessness constitutes scienter for a
1Ob-5 violation.2 7 However, the courts are in substantial disagreement in
terms of the specificity by which a plaintiff must allege the existence of
scienter in order to properly plead a securities fraud case.
In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act (PSLRA) in an effort to prevent frivolous lawsuits between
investors/shareholders and public corporations.2 8 The Act heightens the
burden of class action suits and provides the courts with methods to
define class participants, the length of the class period, and the selection
of class representatives. 29 The Act also provides the defendant
corporations with limited liability for damages. 30 Although the Act does
not change the substantive elements of a securities violation, it is
generally accepted that the Act substantially heightened the pleading
23. See Securities Exchange Act, § 10(b) 15 U.S.C. § 78q. This rule provides:
it is unlawful for any person to (1) employ any device, scheme or artifice to
defraud; (2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or; (3) engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operatesor would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
(emphasis added).
24. See In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989)
(emphasis added).
25. See Ernst & Ernst v.Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. See infra notes 31-35.
28. Private Sec. Litig. Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1998)
[herinafter PSLRA]; see also In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir.
1999).
29. David S. DeBerry and Steven L. White, Significant Developments Since
Passage of Securities Reform Legislation, 14 THE JOHN LINER REv. 1, 1-2 (Summer
2000), available at www~hfpinsurance.com/articles/JLRVI 4n2.pdf.
30. Id. at 7-8.
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requirements to survive a motion to dismiss, which was previously
guided by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 ' Under the
PSLRA, a plaintiff:
may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a
particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or
omission alleged to violate this title [et seq.], state with particularityfacts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind.32

Not surprisingly, since the enactment of the PSLRA, the circuits
have widely disagreed on the requisite standard of pleading. By far, the
least burdensome interpretation of pleading requirements comes from the
Second and Third Circuits. In these circuits, plaintiffs may plead
scienter by alleging facts that give rise to a strong inference that
defendant had a motive and an opportunity to commit fraud, or by setting

forth facts that constitute circumstantial evidence of either reckless or
conscious behavior. 33 By contrast, in the Sixth Circuit, a plaintiff must
allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of reckless behavior, but
not by alleging facts that illustrate nothing more than a "defendant's
motive and opportunity to commit fraud., 34 The Sixth Circuit stated that
recklessness is "understood as a mental state apart from negligence and
akin to conscious disregard. 3 5 The Eleventh Circuit similarly held that
plaintiffs must allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of severe
36
recklessness, requiring something more than "ordinary recklessness.'"
Perhaps the most restrictive interpretation is found in the Ninth Circuit,
which requires a plaintiff to plead, "in great detail, 37 "particular facts
giving

rise

to

a strong inference of deliberate or conscious

31. See In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
If the Reform Act, then, does nothing to disturb the substantive law of what is the
required mental state for a securities fraud violation, it does expressly address, and
alter, what is required to plead the requisite scienter. Specifically, the abovequoted provision of the Reform Act requires a plaintiff to "state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the requisite
state of mind."

Id.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (emphasis added).
33. See In re Advanta Corp., Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Press
v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999).
34. See In re Comshare, Inc., Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999).
35. Id. at 550.
36. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11 th Cir. 1999).
37. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 983 (9th Cir. 1999).
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38

recklessness."
While the circuit courts have spent considerable effort in an attempt
to define the requisite manifestation of scienter, the courts have seldom
examined the far more progressive question of whether a corporation
itself, in contrast to the corporation by virtue of vicarious liability, can
satisfy the requirement of scienter. The PSLRA requires that actions
claiming a securities violation be pled with specificity that a "defendant
acted with the required state of mind" - verbiage that imbues evidence of
identifiable human behavior. 39 Accordingly, the circuit court cases have
characterized the scienter requirement for a violation and fashioned
much of the debate in particularly "human" terms (i.e. recklessness that
requires "motive," "conscious recklessness," etc.). 40 But relying too
heavily on a literal interpretation of the phrase "required state of mind"
ignores the reality that large impersonal organizations can systematically
commit violations and renders the corporation, as a solitary entity,
immune from federal security violations. However, in at least one civil
action brought by plantiffs under the PLRSA, a district court in
Massachusetts examined the concept that a corporation, without an
identifiable human nexus, could meet the requisite state of mind under
federal securities law.4 1 In In re Centennial,Judge Robert Keeton stated:
It does not follow from this point, however, or from the phrase
"required state of mind," that no legal entity other than a natural person
can be held accountable because the entity is a creature of the law and
literally cannot have a mind or state of mind.42
The concept of organizational accountability, knowledge, and
scienter, in the absence of a "natural person" is not utilized within the
ambit of federal securities case history.43 Dicta, such as that expressed by
Judge Keeton in In re Centennial, is not common.4 4 While the courts
have spent considerable efforts defining (and disagreeing upon) what is
reckless - few, if any, courts have ventured into the progressive area of
what can be reckless. However, a survey of cases currently in the
pleading stage, suggests that courts are likely to turn attention to this
38. Id. at 979. (emphasis added).
39. PSLRA, supra note 28.
40. Supra, notes 33-37.
41. See In re Centennial Techs. Litig., 20 F. Supp. 2d 119, 126 (D. Mass. 1998).
42. Id.
43. There does not seem to be a single published case where an organization is
deemed to have met the scienter requirement without the use of vicarious liability for an
employees wrongful actions.
44. In re Centennial, 20 F. Supp. 2d 119.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol25/iss2/9

8

2005]

SECURITIES, SCIENTER, & SCHIZOPHRENIA

391

issue.
Unlike many securities cases that often implicate readily identifiable
persons within corporations of wrongful accounting statements, or
fraudulent underwriting practices, recent pleadings concentrate heavily
on wrongful corporate rules and policies, undisclosed business processes,
and faulty or non-existent compliance systems - situations particularly
unique to large multi-service investment firms. 45 A survey of pleadings
filed over the past year indicates a shift from pleading wrongful behavior
by individuals to a more sophisticated strategy of pleading illegal
business practices and wrongful corporate policies.46 These pleadings
rely on voluminous data regarding illegal tie-in agreements, collusive
research agreements, and irregularities within the business structure of
initial public offerings.4 7 While pleadings still attempt to provide courts
with as much information and evidence regarding an individual's
culpable violation of securities laws, many of the organizational
practices, implicated as violative of federal securities laws in these
pleadings, are simply too widespread throughout organizations and the
industry to identify individual culpable actors. With alleged harm the
result of unidentifiable collective human behavior, recent plaintiffs are
drawing attention to inadequate compliance initiatives in an effort to
meet statutory requirements of scienter.4 s Compliance initiatives have
already been the subject of intense scrutiny and provide the path for a
sensible judicial inquiry.
III. The Evolution of Compliance from Voluntary Process to Legal
Requirement
During the recent investigation by New York Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer and the ensuing global settlement, corporate compliance
policies and procedures became the focus of intense public scrutiny.4 9
45. Unlike the securities cases of the eighties and nineties, often centering on
fraudulent accounting or underwriting practices, generally with identifiable characters,
today's pleadings indict far less overt schemes to defraud and suggest far more systemic
problems of business practices and a lack of rules and policies. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub.
Offering Sec. Litig., 21 MC 92 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. 2003), availableat http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/briefs/ipo-antitrust.htm.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Adrian Michaels, Companies The Americas: Security Chief Favours Simpler
Conflict Of Interest Rules, Financial Times (London), July 24, 2003, at 24, available at
http://securities.stanford.edu/news-archive/2003/20030724-Headline07-Michaels.htm.
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The gravamen of the complaint that led to the settlement is that research
analysts employed at these firms issued "buy" recommendations on
stocks without disclosing conflicts of interest to their brokerage clients.50
The complaint suggests, that because compensation of analysts was tied
to the amount of underwriting business that was generated, and favorable
stock recommendations resulted in increased underwriting, analysts
misinformed retail clients in order to boost underwriting revenue.5 1 In
not revealing this conflict of interest to their customers, the analysts and
their firms violated nondisclosure provisions of New York's Martin Act,
the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.52
The investigation also provided a bevy of information regarding
evidence of tie-in agreements, collusive research arrangements, and
inflated commission structures. Although the investigation identified
seriously egregious conduct by individuals, the investigation strongly
implicated that the policies and procedures adopted by the corporations
were themselves recklessly constructed to allow for securities
violations. 53 In a sense, the policies and procedures were deemed
structurally inadequate to prevent a corporation from committing
securities violations. Thus, in addition to the payment of fines, the
global settlement required substantial changes in operational
practices.54 The following is a list of the organizational changes agreed
to in the global settlement:
The firms will physically separate their research and investment
banking departments to prevent the flow of information between the two
groups.
The firms' senior management will determine the research
department's budget without input from investment banking and without
regard to specific revenues derived from investment banking.
Research analysts' compensation may not be based, directly or
indirectly, on investment banking revenues or input from investment
banking personnel, and investment bankers will have no role in
evaluating analysts' job performance.

N.Y.

50. Gretchen Morgenson, MerrillAgrees to Broaden Its Disclosureon Its Research,
TIMES, April 19, 2002, at C2.

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Global Settlement: HearingBefore the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://banking.senate.gov/index.
cfmi?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=28.
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Research management will make all company-specific decisions to
terminate coverage, and investment bankers will have no role in
company-specific coverage decisions.
Research analysts will be prohibited from participating in efforts to
solicit investment banking business, including pitches and roadshows.
During the offering period for an investment banking transaction,
research analysts may not participate in roadshows or other efforts to
market the transaction.
The firms will create and enforce firewalls restricting interaction
between investment banking and research except in specifically
designated circumstances.
A complete ban on the spinning of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs).
Brokerage firms will not allocate lucrative IPO shares to corporate
executives and directors who are in the position to greatly influence
investment banking decisions.
An obligation to furnish independent research. For a five-year
period, each of the brokerage firms will be required to contract with no
less than three independent research firms that will provide research to
the brokerage firm's customers. An independent consultant ("monitor")
for each firm, with final authority to procure independent research from
independent providers, will be approved by regulators. This will ensure
that individual investors get access to objective investment advice.55
Shortly after the global settlement, Congress passed the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002. In response to an unparalleled loss of integrity in
corporate governance and an unprecedented loss of shareholder wealth,
the Act was created to enhance the enforcement of the federal securities
laws and bring investor confidence back to the capital markets.56 The
Act includes legislation that specifically addresses the issue of
compliance policies and procedures, and places compliance at the
forefront of corporate accountability within multi-service investment
firms. 7 Under section 501 of the Act, federal law now mandates that
multi-service investment firms establish compliance procedures that
safeguard the public from internal conflicts of interest. 58 Specifically, the

55. Id. at 7-8.
56. The Implementation of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony
of Williams H. Donaldson, Chairman, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/090903tswhd.htm.
57. See Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 3, at § 501(a).
58. Id. Sarbanes-Oxley reads as follows:
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Act requires:
structural and institutional safeguards within registered brokers or
dealers to assure that securities analysts are separated by appropriate
informational partitions within the firm from the review, pressure, or
oversight of those whose involvement in investment banking activities
might potentially bias their judgment or supervision. 59
In accord with this directive, both the National Association of
Securities Dealers ("NASD") and the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") have created rules to compel multi-service investment firms to
implement stringent compliance safeguards. 60 Both the NASD and the
NYSE now require active monitoring of information between various
segments of multi-service firms and place compliance initiatives as the
optimal 1 way for an organization to avoid liability under Sarbanes6
Oxley.

Safeguards within multi-service investment firms are not new. For
nearly thirty years, "informational partitions" or "Chinese Walls" were
self-imposed by multi-service investment firms as a way to minimize the
(a) Analyst Protections - The Commission, or upon the authorization and direction
of the Commission, a registered securities association or national securities
exchange, shall have adopted, not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of
this section, rules reasonably designed to address conflicts of interest that can arise
when securities analysts recommend equity securities in research reports and
public appearances, in order to improve the objectivity of research and provide
investors with more useful and reliable information, including rules designed to
foster greater public confidence in securities research, and to protect the objectivity
and independence of securities analysts.
Id.
59. See Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 3, at § 501(a)(c)(3).
60. See NASD Rule 2711 (b)(3):(A)(2003):
Any written communication between non-research personnel and research
department personnel concerning the content of a research report must be made
either through authorized legal or compliance personnel of the member or in a
transmission copied to such personnel; and (B) any oral communication between
non-research personnel and research department personnel concerning the content
of a research report must be documented and made either through authorized legal
or compliance personnel acting as intermediary or in a conversation conducted in
the presence of such personnel.
Id.; see also NYSE Rule 472(b)(1)(2)(ii)-(3), which prohibits research personnel from
being subject to the supervision of any employees of an Investment Banking Department,
and "will further require legal or compliance personnel to intermediate certain
communications between the Research Department and either the Investment Banking
Department or the company that is the subject of a research report by the Research Dept."
NYSE Rule 472(b)(1)(2)(ii)-(3), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/2002-09AmlAmendedExhA.pdf.
61. Id.
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inherent conflicts that exist within their firms and avoid a finding of
scienter.62 The basic notion of Chinese Walls was that if the firm
prevented employees from exploiting non-public information by keeping
conflicting segments of the firm separate, the firm could not be found to
meet the scienter requisite of a lOb-5 violation.63 However, prior to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the new regulatory rules, the courts were
reluctant to give legal effect to Chinese Wall procedures.6 4
In Nelsen v. Craig-Hallum, Inc., the Federal District Court in
Minnesota refused to dismiss a claim brought by plaintiff under SEC
Rule lOb-5 solely on the existence of a Chinese Wall. 65 In CraigHallum, Inc., the defendant allegedly issued misleading statements and
recommendations in numerous research reports regarding one of its
investment banking clients. 66 Craig-Hallum argued that the presence of a
Chinese Wall meant, as a matter of law, that there could be no material
misrepresentation under federal securities laws.67 The company argued
that while the investment banking department had adverse information
regarding a company, it did not pass this information along to its
brokerage department.6 8 The court stated that whatever information was
passed between and throughout the firm "create[d] fact issues of
misrepresentation, materiality and scienter appropriately left to the
jury. '69 The court further added that Craig-Hallum "has not provided
legal authority for this court to adopt its position that brokerage firms
who perform both investment banking and securities sales functions can
rely on an unwritten 'Chinese Wall' policy as demonstrating lack of
knowledge and scienter in an action under Rule lOb-5." 7 ° In CraigHallum, the court clearly indicates that the validity or efficacy of Chinese
Wall procedures was a matter for a jury and that the corporation could be

62. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND STEERING COMMITTEE ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
THE SECURITIES MARKETS, ABUSE ON WALL STREET: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE
SECURITIES MARKETS 405 (1980).

63. Id.
64. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Goskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and
CriminalLiability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559,

1589-92 (1990).
65. See Nelsen v. Craig-Hallum, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 480 (D. Minn. 1987).
66. Nelsen v. Craig-Hallum, Inc., 1989 WL 91131, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 94,500, at 2
(D. Minn. Jun. 26, 1989).
67. Nelsen, 659 F. Supp at 485.
68. Id.
69. Nelsen, 1989 WL 91131, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 94,500, at 2.
70. Id. at 2.
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evaluated for its commitment to federal securities laws.7 1 This case
settled out of court 72 and there does not appear to be a single published
case where a jury has evaluated Chinese Wall procedures.
In the 1980's, in part due to the multitude of well-known insider
trading scandals, regulators saw the need to provide liability protection
for firms that operated to prevent the misuse of nonpublic material
information.73 As a result, the SEC began to promulgate rules that
allowed different departments within a multi-service investment firm to
operate, without triggering a securities violation if the firm could
implement compliance measures that would ensure separation of
information in tender offers.74 Hence, for the first time, the SEC codified
that a Chinese Wall procedure could reduce liability when the
organization operates properly. 75 SEC Rule 14e-3(b) provides:
that certain transactions by multi-service financial institutions under
certain circumstances which would otherwise be proscribed will not
violate Rule 14e-3(a). This exception is available for purchases or sales
by multi-service institutions where the institution can show that the
individuals making the investment decision did not know the information
and that the institution has established policies and procedures,
reasonable under the circumstances, to 7ensure
that individual decision
6
maker(s) would not violate Rule 14e-3(a).
Hence, Chinese Walls were given a modicum of legal effect.
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Insider Trading Sanctions Act,
confirming the validity of the Commission's approach to these conflicts
questions.77 Legislative records indicate that Congress believed that
adequate compliance initiatives should provide the corporation with
some measure of protection.
The [House] Committee believes that there should be certain limits
on the liability of a multiservice firm, such as a broker-dealer or
insurance company, where one employee possesses information but
another employee, not knowing of the information, trades for the firm's
account before the information is made public. Under both existing law
71. Id.
72. Nelsen v. Craig-Hallum, Inc., No. 4:86-cv-00135-DSD (order approving final
distribution of settlement) (May 31, 1990).
73. See Pitt & Goskaufmanis, supra note 64.
74. Id.
75. Id.at 1618.
76. SEC Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2003).
77. Pitt & Goskaufmanis, supra note 64 (citing Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984, H.R. Rep. No. 355, at 11 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274).
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and the bill, such a firm with an effective "Chinese Wall" would not be
liable for trades effected on one side of the wall, notwithstanding inside
information possessed by firm employees on the other side.78
Hence, Chinese Walls represented an organization's commitment to
federal securities laws and an ineffective compliance program, in turn,
exposed the firm to liability. But compliance initiatives, as reflected by
Chinese Wall efficacy, have never been used to signify organizational
scienter. To clarify further, while a porous Chinese Wall has provided a
means of assigning liability to corporations, an ineffective compliance
program has never been viewed as an ipso facto substitute for
organizational scienter. While Chinese Walls have been an integral part
of corporate compliance policies and procedures of investment firms for
nearly thirty years, they have had only a limited function - offering
companies liability protection. However, since the passage of SarbanesOxley, corporations now have a legal duty to maintain Chinese Wall
79
policies and procedures that were once solely self-imposed. As a result,
the legal effectiveness of corporate compliance and the level of
conformance to regulatory standards are likely to be subject to increased
Notwithstanding these new regulations, the
judicial scrutiny.
effectiveness of Chinese Walls in preventing the misuse of material nonpublic information continues to be questionable. s

78. Id. (citing Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, H.R. Rep. No. 355, at
11)(1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2284).
79. See Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 3.
80. Press Release, Univ. of Mich. Bus. Sch., "Chinese Walls" Fail to Curb Conflicts
of Interest (Feb. 13, 2003) (quoting H. Nejat Seyhum, Professor of Finance at the Univ.
of Mich. Bus. Sch.), available at http://www.bus.umich.eduNewsRooi/Article
Display.asp?news-id=267.
Our study does not support the logic of the recent deregulation in financial services
Recent
firms that assumes Chinese walls are effective and appropriate...
deregulation has moved away from complete separation of various functions under
separate corporate ownership and allowed the same firm to engage in multi-service
activities provided they are separated by a Chinese wall.
But our evidence shows that these walls do not work effectively and that
information flows between departments. Chinese walls need to be reinforced and
measures are needed for increased monitoring and increased sanctions for
violations.
Overall, our evidence suggests that Chinese walls are not effective. The presence
of the securities firms representatives reduces informational asymmetries for the
client firms, eliminates the ability of the client-firm insiders to trade profitably, and
reduces the bid-ask spread, as well as the volatility of the stock returns in the client
firms' stocks.
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IV. Compliance as a Source of Organizational Scienter
Recently, some courts have suggested that "organizational scienter"
could theoretically exist in the absence of identifiable human
involvement. In Nordstom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
examined the concept that a corporation could exhibit a scienter separate and distinct from individuals within the corporation.82 In
Nordstrom, after the retailer settled a derivative securities suit with
shareholders resulting from misrepresentations on a prospectus, the
retailer's insurance company, Federal, refused to cover that part of
damages not specifically flowing from the officer's misrepresentations.8 3
Federal claimed that since the policy only indemnified officers it should
not be responsible for that part that was solely the fault of the
corporation. 84 In essence, it argued that Nordstom, the corporation, had a
scienter separate and distinct from the individuals of the organization.8 5
The court had determined that the liability of the officers was both a
product of their individual actions and, in part, Nordstrom's actions as a
86
corporation, via respondeatsuperior.
Although the court held against Federal, it did so because the
corporation was responsible for the officer's misrepresentation via the
controlling person doctrine, not because it denied the existence of an
organizational scienter. 87 The court added that "[t]heoretically, collective
scienter could be a basis for liability." 88 To further its point, the court
cites Knepper and Bailey that " [a] corporation's knowledge need not be
possessed by a single officer or agent; the cumulative knowledge of all
its agents will be imputed to the corporation., 8 9 However, the court
added, "[t]here is no case law supporting an independent 'collective
scienter' theory." 90 Lastly, the court offered support for its theoretical
musing of organizational scienter, one based on corporate procedure, not

81. See WEICK, supra note 5.
82. See Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1995).
83. Id. at 1427.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. NordstromInc., 54 F.3d at 1427.
88. Id. at 1435.
89. Id. at 1435 (quoting WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF
CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS, § 17.06 (4th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992)).
90. Id.
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individual action. 9 1
In In re Warner Communications Securities Litigation, the court
acknowledged that scienter might actually provide a lesser burden on a
92
defendant if it found evidence of procedurally negligent behavior. The
court stated:
the requisite degree of scienter is likely to be easier to attribute to
Warner than to the individual defendants. As to Warner, plaintiffs
arguably need only show either that one or more members of top
management knew of material information indicating an earnings
decline, but failed to stop the issuance of misleading statements or to
correct prior statements that had become misleading, or that Warner
management had recklessly failed to set up a procedure that insured the
dissemination of correct information to the marketplace. In contrast, the
not be as easily shown. 93
scienter of each individual defendant would
(emphasis added).
The courts in Nordstom and In re Warner express an intriguing and
perhaps prophetic concept that supports the notion of corporate policies
and procedures providing evidence of organizational scienter. There is a
small group of securities cases where plaintiffs have attempted to use
violations of regulatory standards to help plead the requisite scienter
under 1Ob-5 actions.94 These cases primarily raise the argument that
corporate accounting policies that are in violation with Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"), should be sufficient to
establish scienter and meet the requisite element of scienter. The
threshold question of most of the "GAAP" cases is whether a
corporation's violation of standardized recognition of revenue practices
is sufficient evidence of scienter. While almost all cases agree that
95
violations alone will not meet the required scienter, the existence of
violations is strong enough when taken with almost any other indicia to
96
meet the requisite intent. Such other elements include: the similarity of

91. Id. at 1436.
92. See In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 752 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
93. Id. at 752.
94. See, e.g., In re Ramp Networks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ca.
2002); see also Gelfer v. Pegasystems, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D. Mass. 2000);
Chalverus v. Pegasystems, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Mass. 1999).
95. See Chalverus, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 233 (holding that a defendant's failure to
recognize revenue in accord with GAAP does not, by itself, suffice to establish scienter).
96. Id. at 235 (citing Malone v. Microdyne Corp. 26 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 1994)). The
court noted that while GAAP violations do not by themselves constitute circumstantial

17

PACE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 25:383

a defendant's past conduct, the magnitude and frequency of violations,
and evidence that defendants violated their own internal policies. 97
When internal policies and procedures are amiss in a more heavily
regulated environment, substandard corporate initiatives have (in at least
one notable case) met the requisite for corporate scienter.98 In the
commercial banking industry, criminal liability has been imputed to a
corporation for the collective, unintentional acts of its employees. 99 In
United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., a commercial bank was
found criminally liable for "willfully" violating 31 U.S.C. § 5322, the
Federal Reporting Act, when tellers repeatedly did not fill out Currency
Transaction Report (CTR) forms, which are required under the statute.' 00
Although the court noted the teller's actions were not intentional, the
court attributed willfulness to the corporation as a result of regular
transactions that went repeatedly unnoticed by the bank.' ' The court
added "willfulness can rarely be proven by direct evidence, since it is a
state of mind, and is usually established by drawing reasonable
inferences from the available facts.' 1 2 Bank of New England, N.A
suggests that a corporation can act willfully even when criminal behavior
of low-level employees reflect a lesser mens rea than willfulness. Thus,
the bank was held liable because its compliance initiatives had failed to
detect the regular and continuous violations by its employees. 3 This
case is noteworthy in that, beyond simply being vicariously liable, the
court attributed a scienter element - willful blindness, directly from the
corporation.
V. Assessing Organizational Scienter
A new and perhaps more functional approach to allocating
organizational liability appears in the Restatement (Third) of Torts. The
Restatement's authors suggest that corporate negligence, in terms of
product liability, can be determined by an objective comparison of a
evidence of scienter, the GAAP violations combined with the omission of the return
policy and the public statements were "more than sufficient to support a factfinder's
inference the defendants intended to deceive, manipulate, or defraud investors." Id.
97. See Gelfer, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 10.
98. See United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987).
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 854.
103. Bank of New England,N.A., 821 F.2d 844.
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company's product design with those of other companies in the same
industry.10 4 Under the theory, a corporation that is using a "state-of-theart" design, in terms of product safety, has exhibited non-negligent
behavior.10 5 If, however, there is a reasonable alternative design that
produces a safer product, and the company chooses not to adhere to the
06
standard, the company is presumed to be operating with negligence.
The Restatement's theory does not require a finding that any single
employee or group of employees acted with negligence, but rather that
negligence was borne solely out of the corporation's "collective" noncompliance with generally accepted, industry-wide safety standards.
The most significant contribution of this more collective approach is
that it provides a cogent paradigm within which to assign organizational
liability without the requirement of an identifiable human element. By
assigning value to organizational behavior relative to an industry
standard, the approach overcomes the most severe shortcoming of
traditional derivative liability by obviating the need of an evidentiary
trail beginning with individual human decision-making. Hence, the
Restatement's approach assigns a value to organizational scienter
without a burdensome judicial inquiry or the need for a plaintiff to
extract evidence of individual human behavior in a large impersonal
corporation.
It was this very strategy that the plaintiffs in the "GAAP" cases
were attempting to use to meet their pleading burden of federal securities
laws. 10 7 In those cases, the plaintiffs sought to establish negligence by
providing the court with an industry standard and asking the court to
view deviation from that standard as prima facia evidence of
negligence. 10 8 The courts, in the absence of more evidence, declined the
invitation. 0 9 Applying a similar application in regard to compliance
104. UNDERSTANDrNG TORTS, supra note 10, at 380.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Svezzese v. Duratek, Inc., No. Civ. A. MJG-01-CV-1830, 2002 WL
1012967 (D. Md. Apr. 30, 2002) "Plaintiff asserts that the following allegations, taken as
a whole, are sufficient to establish a strong inference that Defendants' conduct was
reckless: (a) the GAAP violations, (b) the simplicity of the accounting rules violated; (c)
the deficiency of Duratek's internal controls; (d) the magnitude of the restatement." Id.
108. Id.
109. Svezzese, 2002 WL 1012967, at *6. While, of course, "internal policies are
relevant to scienter to the extent that they correspond to violations of GAAP and GAAS
or that they indicate an auditor's awareness of problems in corporate finances," such
allegations cannot, without accompanying allegations of fraudulent intent, be sufficient to
raise a strong inference of scienter.
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deviations might have a different outcome. Compliance, more so than
GAAP standards, provides a much better basis to find organizational
scienter based on deviance from industry standards.
OrganizationalSentencing Guidelines
Perhaps the strongest argument proving that compliance initiatives,
as expressed through the efficacy of a corporation's Chinese Wall
procedures, are a valid assessment of "organizational scienter," is found
in the vital role compliance plays in the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines (the Guidelines). In 1984, Congress created the Federal
Sentencing Commission (the Commission) in an effort to bring more
uniformity to federal sentencing. 110 The Commission promulgates
standardized sentences for federal crimes to be applied by all federal
courts."' In 1991, the Commission extended a similar guide to be
applied to organizations that had been convicted of federal crimes.11
The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, like the guidelines for
individuals, is a set of standardized criteria used to levy punishment on
an organization after conviction.' 13 However, the inability to incarcerate
organizations shifts much of the substance of the Guidelines, as applied
to corporations, to pecuniary and injunctive punishment. 114
The Guidelines place enormous importance on the role of
compliance in determining the punishment of a corporation." 5
Following a conviction, the Guidelines instruct the court during
sentencing to assign a base fine amount, based on a variety of factors,
which is either increased or decreased, depending on the efficacy of the
corporation's compliance initiatives.'16 As a mechanism to promote selfpolicing and lawful behavior, the Guidelines employ a "carrot and stick"
approach that reduces the severity of fines following a corporate
conviction if that corporation has an effective compliance department. It
follows, that a corporation without a compliance department, or one that
is merely illusory, is exposed to fines up to the full extent allowed under
Id. (quoting Gelfer v. Pegasystems, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17 (D. Mass. 2000)).
110. CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: COMPLIANCE AND MITIGATION
Law Journal Seminars Press (1996) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
111. Id.
112. GUIDELINES, supra note 110, § 1.05.
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. GUIDELINES, supra note 110, § 5.04.
116. GUIDELINES, supra note 110, § 2.05.
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Thus, an effective compliance department is a
the Guidelines.
corporation's optimal way to exhibit behavior that it intends to abide by
the law. In this regard, Congress already views compliance initiatives as
a litmus test of a company's dedication to adhere to regulatory and
federal law. In a very real sense, Congress already views compliance
initiatives as a viable source to glean organizational scienter.
In terms of assigning value to a compliance initiative, in a vast,
complex and dynamic business environment, the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines also incorporate an element of "relativism" not all
that different from the theory advocated by tort reformists. Subsequent
comments to the original guidelines suggest that compliance efforts are
often evaluated in relation to industry standards.' 1 7 A 1996 comment
states that, "the company should indicate (in its compliance materials)
that the code represents a corporate effort not only to meet but also to
exceed the requirements of law and industry practice in a manner
consistent with the company's high standards of business conduct."'1 8 In
this regard, comparison analysis between compliance initiatives, within
the same industry, uses the same theory advocated by tort reformists and
obviates the burden of creating universally accepted compliance
standards. The flexibility of industry specific criteria is extremely
important when harm is similarly unique within an industry. Consider
the following hypothetical:
Assume arguendo that all multi-service investment firms decide to
separate their investment bankers from research analysts in different
buildings and prohibit contact between employees. Most firms in the
industry decide to have two sets of analysts - those that follow the stock
up to the point of an offering and those that follow the stock in the
secondary market. These firms will not allow the first analyst to convey
any information regarding pre-offering research to the second analyst. In
these firms, there is simply a changing of the guard once a stock is in the
after market. As a result, there is no possibility that the pre-IPO analysts
can taint research to bias the market since he no longer publishes
information. If this is widely adopted, and becomes the standardized
industry norm, then a lone firm that still allows one analyst to follow a
stock in both the pre and post offering periods, under a comparative
approach, would create the presumption of wrongdoing. The burden of
going forward in a civil action would then shift from the plaintiff to the

117. GUIDELINES, supra note 110,
118. Id.

§

5.07.
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defendant. In terms of tort reformers, by not using the "State of the Art"
compliance initiatives, the defendant
would now bear the burden of
19
moving forward with the case. 1
Finally, the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines are clear in that
an organization must respond to its environment. 120 The Guidelines state
that compliance initiatives and programs to correct wrongful employee
behavior, must respond and be altered when new laws come into effect
or when an industry or an organization has any previous violations. The
compliance department is the barometer used by the Commission to
determine how seriously a corporation reacts to changes in a regulatory
environment.
Realistically speaking, the Commission expects the
corporation to function exactly like the organizational behavior theory
introduced at the beginning of this note - "controlling [its corporate]
behavior (e.g.
though rules and programs) and relying on continuous
12 1
feedback."'
With the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002 and the subsequent
promulgation of rules mandating informational barriers by the NASD
and the NYSE, the securities industry, like the commercial banking
industry, is now a far more regulated industry than in the past. As in
commercial banking, investment banks have been furnished with very
specific rules and procedures that express their behavior and must
actively monitor their procedures, or risk that a court will find that their
organization has acted with "willful blindness."
VI. Conclusion
The efficacy of a corporation's compliance initiatives is a viable
area to find a requisite scienter element for violative organizational
behavior. In the securities industry, Chinese Walls have traditionally
been self-imposed, non-mandated procedures to avoid liability. Today,
Chinese Walls are mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. With this new
legal significance, the administration of Chinese Wall policies and

119. The use of industrial norms and the deviance of commercial norms to
determine corporate accountability is not new and appears in many other areas of
commercial law. See, e.g., U.C.C. §3-103(a)(4) (Standards of good faith are based on
"observance of commercial standards of fair dealing").
120. GUIDELINES, supra note 110, § 5.07. (The commentary notes that after a
violation has been detected, "the organization must have taken all reasonable steps ...to
prevent further similar offenses - including any modifications to its program to prevent
and detect violations of the law." (quoting U.S.S.G § 8A1.2, comment (n.3(k)(7))).
121. See MORGAN, supra note 6.
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procedures (its compliance with new Sarbanes, NASD, and NYSE
regulations), provides useful insight regarding a corporation's intent to
comply with securites laws.
Congress has, in effect, provided courts with a new justiciable area
within federal securities law to view corporate behavior and adjudicate
compliance efforts, separate and distinct from the behavior of its
employees. In doing so, Congress has enlarged the range of pleading
alternatives available to plaintiffs. While pleadings have traditionally
involved evidence of a "natural person's" violative behavior with these
actions imputed to the company, plaintiffs now have a viable alternative
with an objective paradigm to examine and question the violative
corporate behavior. Looking forward, the PSLRA requirement that a
plaintiff plead with particularityfacts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind, should be
extended by the courts to include particularfacts that give rise to a
strong inference that compliance initiativesare substantiallyinconsistent
with readily-accepted industry norms. Such a test would help to
overcome the problem courts have in determining the proper scienter for
pleading securities cases, provide plaintiffs with a less onerous burden to
plead violations, and provide corporations with the assurance that
"State-of-the-Art" compliance will provide protection from future
securities liability. Hence, the very last leap for legal theorists, the courts,
and the legislatures is either the codification or common law directive
that a compliance initiative is an indication of organizational scienter as
is needed to fulfill statutory required elements.
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